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ON THE POSSIBLE
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VANISHMENT OF EPISTEMIC 
OBJECTS
Abstract: When considering the 
question of possible transforma-
tion and disappearance of scientifi c 
objects, it is useful to distinguish
between epistemic and technical ob-
jects. Th is paper presents preliminary 
observations and off ers a typology of 
obsolescence. It is based on several 
case studies drawn from the history 
of life sciences. Th e paper proceeds as
follows: fi rst, the dynamics of epis-
temic objects is considered through
the examples of Carl Correns’ study 
of “xenia”, Alfred Kühn’s work on
physiological developmental genet-
ics, and Paul Zamecnik’s research
on the protein biosynthesis. Second,
the phasing out of technical objects
is then separately discussed and 
illustrated by the example of ra-
dioactive tracing in biology – until 
recently, an established technique of 
visualization.
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O možné transformaci a mizení 
epistemických objektů
Abstrakt: Zabýváme-li se otázkou
možných transformací a  mizením 
vědeckých předmětů, je užitečné roz-
lišovat mezi epistemickými objekty 
a  objekty technickými. V  předklá-
daném textu autor shrnuje některá 
předběžná pozorování a  podává 
návrh, jak chátrání vědeckých před-
mětů typologizovat. Opírá se přitom 
o několik případových studií vychá-
zejících z  oblasti dějin přírodních 
věd. O  dynamice epistemických ob-
jektů nejprve pojednává na  příkla-
dech Corrensova studia tzv. „xenie“, 
Kühnova výzkumu v oblasti fyziolo-
gické vývojové genetiky a  Zamecni-
kova výzkumu biosyntézy proteinů. 
V  druhém kroku a  odděleně pak 
autor sleduje fenomén opouštění 
technických objektů, k jehož ilustraci 
volí a  diskutuje příklad radioaktiv-
ního stopování, které v  biologickém 
výzkumu ještě donedávna platilo 
za etablovanou techniku vizualizace.
Klíčová slova: epistemický objekt;
technický objekt; zastarávání;
Carl Correns; Alfred Kühn; Paul 
Zamecnik; radioaktivní stopování
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Introductory Remarks
Let me start with a preliminary conceptual clarifi cation: Th e title talks about 
the possible transformation and vanishment of epistemic objects. What is an
epistemic object, or an epistemic thing? Epistemic objects are the targets of 
research, those things about which we would like to know more. Th at is why 
they are particularly elusive. In their elusiveness, they stand in contrast to 
the technical objects – instruments, procedures, apparatus of sorts – with 
which they are supposed to be brought into interaction. Epistemic objects 
are thus characteristically underdetermined. Technical objects, in contrast, 
are characteristically determined. Both kinds of entities do not only come 
into being in the course of research processes and are integral constituents 
thereof. Th ey can also become obsolete. In addition, they can become trans-
formed into each other, of which I will give an example later.
Actually, in the fi rst category, the epistemic things, we can observe – 
roughly speaking – two major forms of obsolescence: Either they turn out 
to be untenable as objects of epistemic concern under continued scrutiny, or 
one loses interest in them in the course of the research process because they 
do not keep what they promise. Objects in the second category tend to get 
out of use because they become replaced by more effi  cient devices. However, 
if we have a closer look at particular instances, we are confronted with much 
more nuanced situations and, correspondingly, more fi ne-grained ways of 
fading. We need to sort out these forms – or shapes – of “obsolescence”, to 
pick up a term that art historian George Kubler uses in his book Th e Shape of 
Time, where he invites us to study the “common traits of invention, change, 
and obsolescence that the material works of artists and scientists both share 
in time.”1
What I would like to do in this paper is to give a few historical examples 
for both kinds of entities – epistemic things as well as technical objects – 
ceasing to be of particular interest and consequently disappearing from the 
scene. Th e examples I am presenting are drawn from a number of case stud-
ies in the history of the life sciences that I have been conducting over the past 
25 years. I  start with the fi rst category, the epistemic objects or epistemic 
things.
1  George KUBLER, Th e Shape of Time. Remarks on the History of Th ings. New Haven: Yale 
University Press 1962, p. 10.
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger
271
From Xenia to Mendel’s Laws: Carl Correns
Let us fi rst have a  look at the German botanist Carl Correns (1864–1933) 
and his re-discovery of Mendel’s laws in the years before and around 1900.2
Correns set out for an investigation of an epistemic object that had been 
intriguing botanists for a  long time and that had roused already the par-
ticular interest of Darwin. Th e phenomenon had been dubbed “xenia”. It 
related to the observation that in certain plant species, characteristics of the 
pollen-giving variety did not only show up in the fi rst hybrid generation, but 
already on the pollinated mother plant, preferably in the fruits and seeds. 
According to the accumulated literature, corn and peas were among the 
hot candidates for the phenomenon to be observed. Th e underlying physi-
ological process was not known when Correns took up the issue, and it was 
exactly the problem that he intended to solve in the end.
But in order to do so, he wanted, to start with, to experimentally produce 
a clear-cut case in point of the phenomenon that was beyond doubt. Accord-
ingly, Correns chose to settle on corn, starting from 1894, and peas, starting 
from 1896, as his experimental plants. Th is determined his experimental 
strategy: to produce as many diff erent crosses as possible with a number of 
carefully preselected varieties. Aft er three generations of crossing, in the 
summer of 1898, Correns still had failed to identify a clear-cut case of xenia 
with his peas. With corn, things looked a bit better in this respect. But he 
made an intriguing additional observation. His second generation of hy-
brids tended to show the original characters of the parents in a one-to-three 
relation, although the scatter of the results was quite wide.
At this point, Correns decided to revise his strategy. On the one hand, 
he pursued the clear cases of xenia in corn in order to prepare for a physi-
ological analysis. On the other hand, he decided to grow a  large amount 
of second-generation hybrids from the fi rst generation hybrid of one of his 
original crosses between pea varieties yielding green and yellow germs, 
respectively, in order to see whether the observed segregation values held.
A year later, Correns learned from the recent literature that his colleagues 
Sergei Nawaschin (1857–1930) in Russia and Léon Guignard (1852–1928) 
in France had solved the riddle of the xenia: Th e phenomenon rested on 
a double fertilization process, resulting in a triploid endosperm surrounding 
the embryo. To pursue his eff orts in this direction thus became meaningless, 
2 For a detailed description, see Hans-Jörg RHEINBERGER, An Epistemology of the Concrete.
Twentieth-Century Histories of Life. Durham: Duke University Press 2010, chap. 4, and refer-
ences therein.
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and he contented himself to prepare for a summary of his work on xenia, 
a preliminary account being published late in 1899 and the extended report 
two years later.
On the other hand, Correns collected large numbers of seeds from his 
pea crosses as of 1899 and established the segregation ratio of 3 : 1 beyond 
doubt. Although he had to acknowledge that aft er all Gregor Mendel had re-
ported the same results already three decades earlier, this fi nding completely 
reoriented Correns’s work for the decades to come. Within a couple of years, 
he advanced to one of the founders of classical genetics. It is interesting in 
this respect that the point of intersection for the rise and fall of the two 
epistemic objects was the biological method of hybridization. Correns had 
started out to use that method in order to establish a physiological phenom-
enon. Th e phenomenon he observed was also a result of hybridization, but 
it revealed itself to be genetic in character, and above that, a purely formal, 
statistical correlation.
What do we have to do with in this case? It depends from which angle we 
look at the story. From the perspective of Correns’s own research trajectory, 
we have to do  with a  coming into being of a  new and the replacement of 
an older epistemic object. But the microstructure of this replacement is less 
clear-cut. In a fi rst step, we observe the coexistence of two epistemic objects, 
one handed down, and the other one newly emerging. In a second step, one 
of them loses its interest for Correns and recedes into the background, not 
through his own experimental moves in the present case, but through the 
achievements of others. In the end, it leads to a complete reorientation of 
Correns’s research focus. He had entered the episode as a physiologist, and 
he emerged from it as a formal genetician.
From the perspective of the research fi elds in play, things look a bit dif-
ferent. Whereas xenia had been looked at until then as being the result of an 
otherwise undefi nable “infl uence” of the pollen on the mother plant, with 
Nawaschin and Guignard’s work they were brought under the paradigm of 
heredity resulting from a non-standard fertilization process, and this very 
paradigm of heredity was just acquiring contours through the parallel work 
of Correns on the character distribution in pea hybrids. Th us, what hap-
pened here with respect to the epistemic objects, we should possibly rather 
address as a displacement.
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From Hormones to Enzymes: Alfred Kühn
Let us turn now to the second example. It concerns the work of German 
zoologist Alfred Kühn (1885–1968) on physiological developmental genetics 
from the middle of the 1920s to the middle of the 1940s.3 I will concentrate 
on a decisive episode in that work between 1930 and 1940 that resulted in 
two major changes in perspective. Before arriving at this point, however, 
I need to sketch the steps that set the stage for that change.
Kühn, together with his assistant Karl Henke (1895–1956), had started 
to work on the genetics of the wing pattern of the fl our moth Ephestia
kühniella in the middle of the 1920s, at a point in time where Drosophila 
melanogaster had already conquered the genetics laboratories around the 
world. Th e regular screening of their mass cultures of the butterfl y yielded 
a red-eyed spontaneous mutant in 1929 that revealed itself to be recessive 
in nature and on which the future work came to rest. Th e complex wing 
pattern receded into the background as an epistemic object, whereas the 
comparatively “simple” switch in the eye color from black to red soon moved 
center stage. Th anks to an ingenious set of transplantation experiments per-
formed by Kühn’s doctoral student Ernst Caspari (1909–1988) in the early 
1930s, it became clear that a substance was involved in the color change that 
was able to freely diff use from wild type tissue transplants to the mutant 
recipient thereby changing the color of the eyes from red to black again. In 
tune with the scientifi c community’s interest in bio-agents at the time, Kühn 
and Caspari addressed the substance as a  “hormone” that was missing in 
the recessive mutant but could diff use from transplants to the host tissue, 
thereby repairing the loss.
Th is new epistemic object now attracted all the attention of the labora-
tory. Years of purifi cation eff orts followed as a prerequisite for the biochemi-
cal characterization of the substance. Th e result of these eff orts was that the 
assumption of a  hormone in action had to be abandoned: What diff used 
from the wild type organ to the mutant host was a  modifi ed amino acid, 
whose production was obviously inhibited in the mutant due to the defect of 
an enzyme that catalyzed this step. Th e idea of a hormone as the epistemic 
object of the observed transformation now became obsolete. It was replaced 
by an amino acid derivative. But there was more: what emerged now was the 
vista of what Kühn called “gene action chains” acting on “substrate chains” 
via the intermediate of enzymes whose production could be hampered by 
3 For details see RHEINBERGER, An Epistemology of the Concrete, chap. 6, and references
therein.
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genetic mutations. With that, he had laid the ground for biochemical genet-
ics as it became dominant in early molecular biology.
How can we summarize this case? Obviously the multiple transforma-
tions of the scientifi c object are even more complex than in the previous 
example. On the one hand, we can see that on several occasions, an epis-
temic object that was pursued for a while falls out of the trajectory: fi rst, the 
pattern of the wing veins of the fl our moth; then a hormone as a genetically 
triggered actor in eye pigment formation. As the trajectory unfolds, they 
disappear as epistemic objects from the process; they become obsolete. But 
the two cases also diff er in one important aspect. In the fi rst instance, a rela-
tively complex epistemic object becomes replaced by a relatively simple one. 
In the second case, a  relatively simple epistemic object, a  hormone, turns 
out to be an even more simple substance, an amino acid derivative. But at 
the same time, it turns out to be merely an element of a vastly more complex 
network of a physiological combined with a genetic action chain. Th e stra-
tegic place in the experiment is the same, but it has become a much more 
complex structure of a diff erent kind, at whose center resides another class 
of bio-agents, no longer hormones, but enzymes.
We see here in all perspicuity that in productive, dynamic experimental 
contexts, emergence and obsolescence are coupled phenomena. As a  rule, 
an obsolete epistemic object becomes replaced by an emergent one. More 
precisely, we could say that obsolescence is conditioned by emergence. 
Becoming obsolete has, as a rule at least, less to do with the intrinsic quali-
ties of the epistemic object, but more with a displacement of promise from 
one epistemic object to another. In this sense, we can look at experimental 
trajectories as a  succession of epistemic objects with a  longer or shorter 
endurance. Th e acts of replacement that punctuate the trajectory can be 
addressed in a  Bachelardian sense as “epistemological ruptures.”4 Th ey 
constitute minor reorienting or major, path-breaking turning points in an 
experimental trajectory.
From Oncology to Molecular Biology: Paul Zamecnik
Let me now come to my third example, the experimental trajectory of Paul 
Zamecnik’s (1912–2009) group at Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston 
between 1945 and 1960, a detailed description of which is given in my book 
4 Gaston BACHELARD, Th e Formation of the Scientifi c Mind. Manchester: Clinamen Press 
2002 (orig. 1938).
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Toward a History of Epistemic Th ings.5 I will briefl y retrace a few of the major
turning points in the group’s eff ort to establish an in vitro system in which 
to study the mechanism of protein biosynthesis. Th e initial goal of the group 
was to fi nd a  clue for the metabolic diff erentiation between healthy and 
cancer cells using rat liver as a probe. A diff erence in the velocity of protein 
synthesis showed up indeed in the fi rst experiments on the way to an in vitro 
system, but this diff erence remained mute experimentally: It did not lend 
itself further specifi cation. Instead, a control became relevant. It showed that 
the incorporation of amino acids into proteins was dependent on a supply of 
energy. In pursuing this line, Mahlohn Hoagland (1921–2009), then a cow-
orker of Zamecnik, was indeed able to demonstrate the activation of amino 
acids through linkage to ATP as a prerequisite for the incorporation process. 
Gradually, over the coming years, the energy dependence of the biosynthetic 
process under analysis took lead over and replaced the original oncological 
question.
In pursuing this line, yet another control became crucial for the further 
experimental itinerary. Around the middle of the 1950s, Zamecnik decided 
to test, as a side activity exploring his in vitro system, the nucleic acid syn-
thesizing capacity of his cellular extracts. To that end, he added radioactive 
nucleic acid building blocks to the fractions, not without checking in par-
allel their protein synthesis activity by adding radioactive amino acids. To 
his surprise, a fraction of the radioactive amino acid appeared to be bound 
to a nucleic acid, not to protein. In analyzing this compound he identifi ed 
a small, soluble ribonucleic acid in one of the fractions. He had identifi ed this 
component in that fraction already before, but deemed it to be a degradation 
product of the much bigger microsomal RNA that he was unable to remove 
from the fraction – a contaminant of the system thus.
A control experiment thus turned out to be the starting point of a com-
pletely new line of research, and a contaminating small RNA of the super-
natant fraction of the system became a new epistemic object, and one of an 
unheard-of kind: a hybrid molecule containing building blocks of nucleic 
acids and amino acids, a molecule that biochemistry simply had been igno-
rant of up to that date. In the further process of investigation, that amino 
acid-laden soluble RNA turned into “transfer RNA” when it became clear 
that this compound was the essential mediator in the uptake of amino acids 
into proteins along an RNA-template, the messenger RNA. Over a period 
5 Hans-Jörg RHEINBERGER, Toward a History of Epistemic Th ings. Synthesizing Proteins in 
the Test Tube. Stanford: Stanford University Press 1997.
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of 15 years, from 1945 to 1960, working out that system had led the MGH 
group from cancer research right into the core of nascent molecular biology.
We can see here another aspect of the relation between epistemic and 
technical objects at work. Epistemic things can be turned into technical ob-
jects. As soon as the major features of transfer RNA had been identifi ed – its 
amino acid carrier function, its coding adaptation function – it was turned 
into an object that operated as a  molecular tool. It became the “Rosetta 
stone”, as one of the protagonists put it, to solve the epistemic riddle of the 
genetic code.
In summarizing this case, we can discern at least four interesting trans-
formations that enrich our picture of the dynamics of epistemic objects: 
First, We start with an epistemic object that does not lend itself to further 
experimentation – an “idling” object, so to speak: the diff erence between 
normal and malignant cells in protein synthetic activity. Second, A “con-
taminant” that resists being purifi ed away turns into an epistemic object 
that has unique biochemical characteristics whose exploration will become 
a fi eld of activity for the next three decades. Th ird, we observe the trans-
formation of an epistemic object that has become stabilized – amino acid 
activation – into an experimental subroutine, that is, into a technical object 
in the context of the given experimental setup. And fourth, the biochemical 
epistemic object dubbed “soluble RNA” turns into a  molecular biological 
object endowed with the powers of genetic information transfer – transfer 
RNA. In this fourth case, the biochemical object in the strict sense of the 
word remains, but its meaning and with that, its functional stake is being 
transformed: it starts to act as a molecular biological entity.
What we see in addition on this example is the tight relation between 
epistemic object and experimental system. Th e transformation of the epis-
temic object induces a  shift  in the direction of experimentation, and vice 
versa: a shift , and be it only a control, in experimentation can give rise to 
a new epistemic object.
Th e Phasing Out of Technical Objects
Let me come, in the last part of this paper, to the obsolescence of research 
technologies, that is, the technical objects implied in the research process. 
Th eir ways of phasing out have to be considered separately, since they dif-
fer considerably in that respect from the performance of epistemic objects. 
I will have a look at two research technologies that were narrowly involved 
in the construction of the third research trajectory described above, to 
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the extent that without them the whole trajectory would not have been 
possible.6
Th e fi rst of them is a research procedure. Radioactive tracing – or radio-
active labeling – allows one to follow the metabolic fate or certain biological 
compounds both in vivo and in vitro through the incorporation of radio-
active isotopes into biomolecules. It became possible when, around 1940, 
radioactive isotopes such as tritium, carbon-14, sulphur-35, and phospho-
rus-32 became available for research, fi rst as byproducts of cyclotrons, later 
and in much greater amounts, of atomic reactors. Th is made the labeling 
of biomolecules feasible that mainly consist of hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, 
phosphorus, and sulphur. It allowed for tracing their path – and that of 
the molecules to which they were attached –, and oft en also the molecular 
nature of the transformations occurring in particular metabolic cascades. 
Th e advantage over the classical methods of microchemistry were at least 
twofold: First, the sensitivity of measurement was raised by several orders 
of magnitude, and second, it made it possible, at least in principle, to fol-
low a particular reaction in samples of a limited purity, due to the fact that 
the radioactive marker carried with it the potential of distinction that left  
everything else in the background.
But in order to exploit this potential, new measuring instruments were 
needed that were adapted to the particularities of these tracers. As the name 
betrays, they were used in only trace amounts, and moreover, with the excep-
tion of phosphorus, they were all weak beta-ray emitters that could hardly 
be traced by conventional Geiger-Müller counters. Th e liquid scintillation 
counter was such an instrument. It was developed in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, and it greatly facilitated the counting of samples containing these 
weak beta-ray emitters. Together, the tracing procedure and the counting 
instrument provided a powerful technology that decisively helped to push 
biology into the realm of the molecular in the course of the 1950s and the 
1960s.
Forty years later, toward the end of the millennium, the technology – 
both the tracing procedure and the liquid scintillation counter – was on the 
verge of disappearing from the general equipment of a standard molecular 
biological research laboratory. In the 1990, advertisements such as the 
following could be found in the advertisement pages of research journals: 
“Make the move to non-isotopic assays!” What had happened? Over the 
course of time, visualization procedures had been developed that surpassed 
6 For more details see RHEINBERGER, An Epistemology of the Concrete, chap. 9.
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radioactive tracing both in sensitivity and in versatility. Not negligible was 
an additional advantage: Th e new visualization technologies – among them 
fl uorescent labeling – came without the danger of contamination and the 
additional burden of waste disposal that had haunted radioactive tracing 
from the beginning. It was thus an accumulation of diff erent advantages that 
created a situation in which, aft er almost half a century, radioactive tracing 
became superseded by more convenient and more effi  cient alternatives.
We can rightly talk in this context of the supersession, or replacement, 
of one technical object by another one. Th e history of research technologies 
in particular is a history of abandoned instruments and procedures. Most
of them have a historically determined life cycle and then disappear from 
the shelves. Th ey are shaped to help bring new epistemic objects into being, 
and the frontiers at which this happens change continuously. We could, in 
parallel to the notion of epistemological rupture, possibly talk here about 
technological ruptures.
Th ese ruptures happen, however, in a diff erent time dimension. Whereas 
it is characteristic for epistemic objects to become obsolete more or less in 
a sudden break, it appears to be characteristic for technical objects to disap-
pear in a  more gradual fashion. Another, possibly more important diff er-
ence concerns the character of the obsolescence itself. Whereas technical 
objects usually become replaced, their position being taken by another, more 
convenient, more precise, or more effi  cient technology, the vanishment of 
scientifi c objects happens in a diff erent register. Usually, a scientifi c object 
disappears from the scene because people lose interest in it, without another 
epistemic object replacing it in the strict meaning of the word. Th e loss of 
interest can – sometimes at least – be due to the fact that the object of con-
cern reveals itself to be phantasmal. In the majority of the cases, however, it 
simply becomes marginalized and is being dropped because it ceases to keep 
the promise that it seemed to off er, without being shown either not to exist 
or to lead on a wrong track.
Th ese are, however, only preliminary observations and considerations 
for a typology of obsolescence in the sciences that has not yet been written.
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